The part of: CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
January 6, 2010
Summary
President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous Administrations to contain Iran’s strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Administration has not changed the previous Administration’s characterization of Iran as a “profound threat to U.S. national security interests,” a perception generated not only by Iran’s nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Obama Administration formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran’s government and by downplaying discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. However, the domestic unrest in Iran that has burgeoned since alleged fraud in Iran’s June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a choice of whether to continue to engage Iran’s government or to back the growing ranks of the Iranian opposition. Although Administration statements in December 2009 were more supportive of the student-led protests than previously, the Administration remained open to negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran along the lines of an October 1, 2009, multilateral agreement with Iran. Under that framework, Russia and France would reprocess some of Iran’s low-enriched uranium for medical use. However, Iran has not, to date, agreed to the stipulated technical details of such a reprocessing program, casting doubts on Iran’s commitment to the tentative deal and sparking renewed discussions of new U.N. sanctions, particularly those that would target members and companies of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Guard is the main element used by the regime to crack down against the protesters. Any additional U.N. Security Council sanctions would build on those put in place since 2006. These sanctions generally are targeted against WMD-related trade with Iran, but also ban Iran from transferring arms outside Iran and restrict dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with, investment in, and credits for Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. Some in Congress believe that additional unilateral U.S. sanctions that try to curb sales to Iran of gasoline could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement. Others believe that sanctioning Iran’s ability to monitor the Internet—or clearer statements of U.S. support for the demonstrators—would help the domestic opposition materially change or even topple the regime. Others believe that new U.S. unilateral or U.N. measures would cause Iran to resist compromise, fracture the U.S.-led coalition that is trying to curb Iran’s program, or hurt the cause of the opposition. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40849, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Casey L. Addis; and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.
Much of the debate over U.S. policy toward Iran has centered on the nature of the current regime; some believe that Iran, a country of about 70 million people, is a threat to U.S. interests because hardliners in Iran’s regime dominate and set a policy direction intended to challenge U.S. influence and allies in the region. President George W. Bush, in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union message, labeled Iran part of an “axis of evil” along with Iraq and North Korea.
Political History
The United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”), who ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when Britain and Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in the early 20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty. Reza Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The Qajars had been in decline for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That dynasty’s perceived manipulation by Britain and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906 constitutionalist movement, which forced the Qajars to form Iran’s first Majles (parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution in December 1906. Prior to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires and dynasties, but whose reach shrunk steadily over time. Since the 16th century, Iranian empires lost control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus (1828), western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and what is now Turkmenistan (1894). Iran adopted Shiite Islam under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which brought Iran out from a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests. The Shah was anti-Communist, and the United States viewed his government as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet Arab regimes and movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah’s time and the Shah supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under pressure from nationalists in the Majles (parliament) who gained strength in the 1949 Majles elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, as Prime Minister. Mossadeq was widely considered left-leaning, and the United States was wary of his policies, which included his drive for nationalization of the oil industry. Mossadeq’s followers began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss Mossadeq, and the Shah fled. The Shah was restored in a successful CIA-supported uprising against Mossadeq. The Shah tried to modernize Iran and orient it toward the West, but in so doing he also sought to marginalize Iran’s Shiite clergy. He exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1964 because of Khomeini’s active opposition, which was based on the Shah’s anti-clerical policies and what Khomeini alleged was the Shah’s forfeiture of Iran’s sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shiite theological center that contains the Shrine of Imam Ali, Shiism’s foremost figure. There, he was a peer of senior Iraqi Shiite clerics and, with them, advocated direct clerical rule or velayat-e-faqih (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent). In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accords between the Shah and Iraq’s Baathist leaders, which settled territorial disputes and required each party to stop assisting each other’s oppositionists, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, from which he stoked the Islamic revolution. Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro-Khomeini forces, allied with a broad array of anti-Shah activists, caused the Shah’s government to collapse in February 1979. Khomeini returned from France and, on February 11, 1979, declared an Islamic Republic of Iran, as enshrined in the constitution that was adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 (and amended in 1989). Khomeini was strongly anti-West and particularly anti-U.S., and relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic turned hostile even before the November 4,1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy by pro-Khomeini radicals.
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition
About a decade after founding the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989. Iran’s regime has always been considered authoritarian, but with a degree of popular input and checks and balances among power centers. The regime Khomeini established—enshrined in an Islamic republican constitution adopted in October 1979 and amended in a national referendum of April 1989—consists of some elected and some appointed positions. National elections under the Islamic republic have always been held, and on time, even during the eightyear Iran-Iraq war, although there are limitations on who is allowed to run. Until the serious popular and intra-regime unrest that followed the June 12, 2009, presidential election, the regime had appeared relatively stable and faced only low-level and episodic unrest from minorities, intellectuals, students, labor groups, and women. Since the elections, the regime has struggled to contain the unrest, which some believe is evolving into a revolutionary movement that will be satisfied only with the outright replacement of the regime with a secular democracy. An increasing number of Iran experts believe this opposition movement—calling itself “The Green Path of Hope”—will eventually lead to a toppling or major alteration of the current regime.
The Supreme Leader, His Powers, and Other Ruling Councils
Upon Khomeini’s death, one of his disciples, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, was selected Supreme Leader by an elected 86-seat “Assembly of Experts.”1 Although he has never had Khomeini’s undisputed authority, Khamene’i has vast formal powers as Supreme Leader that have helped him maintain his grip on power. Amid reports Khamene’I believes that major concessions to the opposition will lead to regime demise, the protest movement is nonetheless increasingly bold in denouncing him and in defying his authority. Some of his peers have criticized his handling of the protest movement, while experts say he is now almost completely dependent on regime security forces, most notably the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Formally, the Supreme Leader is Commander in Chief of the armed forces, giving him the power to appoint commanders and to be represented on the highest national security body, the Supreme National Security Council, composed of top military and civilian security officials. He appoints half of the 12-member Council of Guardians;2 and the head of Iran’s judiciary (currently Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani). Headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the conservative-controlled Council of Guardians reviews legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic law, and it screens election candidates and certifies elections results. The Supreme Leader also has the power, under the constitution, to remove the elected President if either the judiciary or the elected Majles (parliament) say the President should be removed, with cause. The Supreme Leader appoints members of the 42-member Expediency Council, set up in 1988 to resolve legislative disagreements between the Majles and the Council of Guardians but its powers were expanded in 2006 to include oversight of the executive branch (cabinet) performance. Expediency Council members serve five-year terms. The Council, appointed most recently in February 2007, is still headed by Rafsanjani; its executive officer is former Revolutionary Guard commander-in-chief Mohsen Reza’i. The Assembly of Experts is empowered to oversee the work of the Supreme Leader and replace him if necessary, as well as to amend the constitution. The Assembly serves a six-year term; the fourth election for that Assembly was held on December 15, 2006. After that election, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, still a major figure having served two terms as president himself (1989-1997), was named deputy leader of the Assembly. After the death of the leader of the Assembly, Rafsanjani was selected its head in September 2007, outpointing a harder line competitor, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati. (See Figure 1 for a chart of the Iranian regime.)
1 The Assembly also has the power to amend Iran’s constitution.
2 The Council of Guardians consists of six Islamic jurists and six secular lawyers. The six Islamic jurists are appointed
by the Supreme Leader. The six lawyers on the Council are selected by the judiciary but confirmed by the Majles.
Table 1. Major Factions and Personalities
1.Conservatives
Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i سید علی خامنه ای / رهبر جمهوری اسلامی
Born in July 1939 to an Azeri (Turkic) family from Mashhad. Lost the use of his right arm in an assassination attempt in June 1981. Helped organize the Revolutionary Guard and other post-revolution security organs. Served as elected president during 1981-1989 and was selected Khomeini’s successor in June 1989 upon the Ayatollah’s death. Upon that selection, his religious ranking was advanced in the state-run press and official organs to “Ayatollah” from the lower ranking “Hojjat ol-Islam.” Has all the formal powers but not the undisputed authority of his predecessor, founder of the revolutionary regime Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Like Khomeini, Khamene’i generally stays out of day-to-day governmental business but saves his prestige to resolve factional disputes or to quiet popular criticism of regime performance. Has taken more interventionist role to calm internal infighting in wake of June 2009 election dispute. Considered moderate-conservative on domestic policy but hardline on foreign policy and particularly toward Israel. Seeks to challenge U.S. hegemony and wants Israel defeated but respects U.S. military power and fears military confrontation with United States. Generally supports the business community (bazaaris), and opposes state control of the economy. Senior aides in his office include second son, Mojtaba, who is said to be acquiring increasing influence. Has made public reference to purported letters to him from President Obama that he asserts have asked for renewed U.S.-Iran relations.
Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts Chair Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani
رییس مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام و رییس مجلس خبرگان رهبری / علی اکبر هاشمی رفسنجانی
Long a key strategist of the regime, and longtime advocate of “grand bargain” to resolve all outstanding issues with United States, although on Iran’s terms. A mid-ranking cleric, now leads both Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts, although generally perceived as waning in influence generally. Heads moderate-conservative faction known as Executives of Construction. Was Majles speaker during 1981-89 and President 1989-1997. One of Iran’s richest men, family owns large share of Iran’s total pistachio nut production. Supported Musavi in June 2009 election, purportedly financed much of his campaign, and played behind-the-scenes role trying to persuade Supreme Leader to nullify the June 2009 election. Now considered essentially an opponent of the Supreme Leader, the arrest of five Rafsanjani family members in June 2009, may have reflected Khamene’I pressure on him. Daughter Faizah has participated in several opposition protests.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad محمود احمدی نژاد / رییس جمهور جمهوری اسلامی
Declared re-elected on June 12, 2009, and inaugurated August 5, but results still not accepted by his election challengers and protesters. See box on page 8. Majles Speaker Ali Larijani Overwhelming winner for Majles seat from Qom on March 14, 2008, and selected Majles Speaker on May 25 (237 out of 290 votes). Former state broadcasting head (1994-2004) and Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (1993), was head of Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator from August 2005 until October 2007 resignation. Sought to avoid U.N. Security Council isolation. Politically close to Khamene’i but highly critical of Ahmadinejad and criticized election officials for the flawed June 12, 2009, election and subsequent crackdown. However, has grown increasingly threatening against protesters as the opposition has gained strength. Brother of judiciary head.
Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf شهردار تهران / محمد باقر قالیباف
Former Revolutionary Guard Air Force commander and police chief, but a moderate-conservative and ally of Larijani. Encourages comparisons of himself to Reza Shah, invoking an era of stability and strong leadership, while also making use of modern media tools. Lost in the 2005 presidential elections, but supporters won nine out of 15 seats on Tehran city council in December 2006 elections, propelling him to current post as mayor of Tehran. Recruited moderate conservatives for March 2008 Majles election.
Senior Clerics in Qom مجمع مدرسین حوزه علمیه قم
The most senior clerics in Qom, including several Grand Ayatollahs, are generally “quietist”—they believe that the senior clergy should refrain from direct involvement in politics. These include Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi, Grand Ayatollah (former judiciary chief) Abdol Karim Musavi-Ardabili, and Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Sanei, all of whom have criticized regime crackdown against opposition protests. Others believe in political involvement, including Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi. He is founder of the hardline Haqqani school, and spiritual mentor of Ahmadinejad. Fared poorly in December 2006 elections for Assembly of Experts. An assertive defender of the powers of the Supreme Leader and a proponent of an “Islamic state” rather than the current “Islamic republic,” and advocates isolation from the West. May seek to replace Khamene’i. Another politically active senior cleric is Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, mentor of radical Iraqi cleric Moqtada Al Sadr.
Judiciary Chief/Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani قوه قضاییه جمهوری اسلامی / آیت الله صادق لاریجانی
Larijani named in late August 2009 as Judiciary head, replacing Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahrudi, who had headed the Judiciary since 1999. Larijani is brother of Majles Speaker Ali Larijani; both are close to the Supreme Leader. Was appointed primarily to curb Ahmadinejad’s aggressive prosecutions of reformist leaders following June 2009 election dispute. Another Larijani brother, Mohammad Javad, was deputy Foreign Minister during the 1980s.
Militant Clerics Association جامعه روحانیت مبارز
Longtime organization of hardline clerics headed by Ayatollah Mohammad Mahdavi-Kani. Not to be confused with an organization with almost the same name, below. Did not back Ahmadinejad in June 12 presidential elections.
2.Opposition/”Green Path Hope”
All of the blocs and personalities below can be considered part of the Green Path of Hope opposition/revolutionary movement. However, overall leadership of the opposition is unclear, with several components competing for preeminence and the ability to determine the direction of the protest movement.
Mohammad Khatemi/Mir Hossein Musavi محمد خاتمی و میر حسین موسوی
Khatemi—reformist president during 1997-2005 and declared he would run again for President in June 2009 elections, but withdrew when allied reformist Mir Hossein Musavi entered the race in late March 2009. Khatemi elected May 1997, with 69% of the vote; re-elected June 2001with 77%. Rode wave of sentiment for easing social and political restrictions among students, intellectuals, youths, and women that seeks reform but not outright replacement of the regime, but became disillusioned with Khatemi failure to stand up to hardliners on reform issues. Now heads International Center for Dialogue Among Civilizations. Visited U.S. in September 2006 to speak at Harvard and the Washington National Cathedral on “dialogue of civilizations.” Has hewed to staunch anti-Israel line of most Iranian officials, but perceived as open to accepting a Palestinian-Israeli compromise. Musavi has views similar to Khatemi on political and social freedoms and on reducing Iran’s international isolation, but supports strong state intervention in the economy to benefit workers, lower classes. Khatemi supported Musavi challenge to 2009 election legitimacy. Continues to appear at some protests, sometimes intercepted or constrained by regime security agents, but may be losing ground to harder line student opposition leaders who criticize his January 2010 statements indicating regime reconciliation is possible and who want to completely replace the current system. Some Green supporters have left Iran for Europe, Asia, or the United States. Some IRGC and parliamentary hardliners continue to urge his arrest.
Society of Militant Clerics/Mehdi Karrubi مجمع روحانیون مبارز / مهدی کروبی
Reformist grouping once led by Mehdi Karrubi. Karrubi formed a separate “National Trust” faction after losing 2005 election. Ran again in 2009, but received few votes and subsequently has emerged, along with Musavi, as a symbol of the opposition.
Student Opposition Leaders رهبران دانشجویی مخالف: “کنفدراسیون دانشجویان ایرانی” و “دفتر تحکیم وحدت”
Confederation of Iranian Students & Office of Consolidation of Unity (Daftar Tahkim-e- Vahdat)
Staunch oppositionists and revolutionaries, many now favor replacement of the regime with secular democracy. One key bloc in this group is the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), led by Amir Abbas Fakhravar, who was jailed for five years for participating in July 1999 student riots. CIS, committed to non-violent resistance, is successor of Office of Consolidation Unity, which led those riots. CIS supports international efforts to sanction the regime. At the time of those riots, the students had been strong Khatemi supporters, but turned against him for failing to challenge hardliners, particularly after July 1999 violent crackdown on student riots, in which four students were killed. Student leaders attempting—and increasingly succeeding—in gaining support of older generation, labor, clerics, and other segments to topple regime.
Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) جبهه مشارکت ایران اسلامی
The most prominent and best organized pro-reform grouping, but has lost political ground to more active and forceful student core of Green Path opposition movement. Its leaders include Khatemi’s brother, Mohammad Reza Khatemi (a deputy speaker in the 2000-2004 Majles) and Mohsen Mirdamadi. Backed Musavi in June 12 election; several IIPF leaders, including Mirdamadi,detained and prosecuted in postelection dispute.
Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution سازمان مجاهدین انقلاب اسلامی
Organization (MIR) Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support state control of the economy, but want greater political pluralism and relaxation of rules on social behavior. A major constituency of the reformist camp. Its leader is former Heavy Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi, who supported Musavi in 2009 election and was remains jailed for post-election unrest.
Shirin Abadi شیرین عبادی
A number of dissidents have struggled against regime repression for many years, long before the election dispute. One major longtime dissident and human rights activist is Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2003) and Iran human rights activist lawyer Shirin Abadi. Subsequent to the passage of the U.N. General Assembly resolution above, Iranian authorities raided the Tehran office of the Center for Defenders of Human Rights, which she runs. She has often represented clients persecuted or prosecuted by the regime. She left Iran for Europe, fearing arrest in connection with the postelection dispute. In December 2009, the regime confiscated her Nobel Prize award.
Grand Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri آیت الله العظمی حسین علی منتظری
Died December 20, 2009 of natural causes and has become a symbol of some oppositionists. Montazeri was Khomeini’s designated successor until 1989, when Khomeini dismissed him for allegedly protecting intellectuals and opponents of clerical rule He was released in January 2003 from several years of house arrest, and, despite being under close watch, issued statements highly critical of the postelection crackdown.
Other Long Term Dissidents
Other leading dissidents have challenged the regime long before the presidential election. For example, joournalist Akbar Ganji conducted hunger strikes to protest regime oppression; he was released on schedule on March 18, 2006, after sentencing in 2001 to six years in prison for alleging high-level involvement in 1999 murders of Iranian dissident intellectuals that the regime had blamed on “rogue” security agents. Another prominent dissident is Abdol Karim Soroush, who challenged the doctrine of clerical rule. Others in this category include former Revolutionary Guard organizer Mohsen Sazegara, former Culture Minister Ataollah Mohajerani, and Mohsen Kadivar.
Congressional Research Service
7-5700, www.crs.gov, RL32048






