The part of: CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

January 6, 2010

Summary

 President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous Administrations to contain Iran’s strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Administration has not changed the previous Administration’s characterization of Iran as a “profound threat to U.S. national security interests,” a perception generated not only by Iran’s nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Obama Administration formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran’s government and by downplaying discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. However, the domestic unrest in Iran that has burgeoned since alleged fraud in Iran’s June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a choice of whether to continue to engage Iran’s government or to back the growing ranks of the Iranian opposition. Although Administration statements in December 2009 were more supportive of the student-led protests than previously, the Administration remained open to negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran along the lines of an October 1, 2009, multilateral agreement with Iran. Under that framework, Russia and France would reprocess some of Iran’s low-enriched uranium for medical use. However, Iran has not, to date, agreed to the stipulated technical details of such a reprocessing program, casting doubts on Iran’s commitment to the tentative deal and sparking renewed discussions of new U.N. sanctions, particularly those that would target members and companies of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Guard is the main element used by the regime to crack down against the protesters. Any additional U.N. Security Council sanctions would build on those put in place since 2006. These sanctions generally are targeted against WMD-related trade with Iran, but also ban Iran from transferring arms outside Iran and restrict dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with, investment in, and credits for Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. Some in Congress believe that additional unilateral U.S. sanctions that try to curb sales to Iran of gasoline could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement. Others believe that sanctioning Iran’s ability to monitor the Internet—or clearer statements of U.S. support for the demonstrators—would help the domestic opposition materially change or even topple the regime. Others believe that new U.S. unilateral or U.N. measures would cause Iran to resist compromise, fracture the U.S.-led coalition that is trying to curb Iran’s program, or hurt the cause of the opposition. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40849, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Casey L. Addis; and CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.

Much of the debate over U.S. policy toward Iran has centered on the nature of the current regime; some believe that Iran, a country of about 70 million people, is a threat to U.S. interests because hardliners in Iran’s regime dominate and set a policy direction intended to challenge U.S. influence and allies in the region. President George W. Bush, in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union message, labeled Iran part of an “axis of evil” along with Iraq and North Korea.

Political History

 The United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”), who ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when Britain and Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in the early 20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty. Reza Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The Qajars had been in decline for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That dynasty’s perceived manipulation by Britain and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906 constitutionalist movement, which forced the Qajars to form Iran’s first Majles (parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution in December 1906. Prior to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires and dynasties, but whose reach shrunk steadily over time. Since the 16th century, Iranian empires lost control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus (1828), western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and what is now Turkmenistan (1894). Iran adopted Shiite Islam under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which brought Iran out from a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests. The Shah was anti-Communist, and the United States viewed his government as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet Arab regimes and movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah’s time and the Shah supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under pressure from nationalists in the Majles (parliament) who gained strength in the 1949 Majles elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, as Prime Minister. Mossadeq was widely considered left-leaning, and the United States was wary of his policies, which included his drive for nationalization of the oil industry. Mossadeq’s followers began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss Mossadeq, and the Shah fled. The Shah was restored in a successful CIA-supported uprising against Mossadeq. The Shah tried to modernize Iran and orient it toward the West, but in so doing he also sought to marginalize Iran’s Shiite clergy. He exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1964 because of Khomeini’s active opposition, which was based on the Shah’s anti-clerical policies and what Khomeini alleged was the Shah’s forfeiture of Iran’s sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shiite theological center that contains the Shrine of Imam Ali, Shiism’s foremost figure. There, he was a peer of senior Iraqi Shiite clerics and, with them, advocated direct clerical rule or velayat-e-faqih (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent). In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accords between the Shah and Iraq’s Baathist leaders, which settled territorial disputes and required each party to stop assisting each other’s oppositionists, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, from which he stoked the Islamic revolution. Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro-Khomeini forces, allied with a broad array of anti-Shah activists, caused the Shah’s government to collapse in February 1979. Khomeini  returned from France and, on February 11, 1979, declared an Islamic Republic of Iran, as enshrined in the constitution that was adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 (and amended in 1989). Khomeini was strongly anti-West and particularly anti-U.S., and relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic turned hostile even before the November 4,1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy by pro-Khomeini radicals.

Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition

About a decade after founding the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989. Iran’s regime has always been considered authoritarian, but with a degree of popular input and checks and balances among power centers. The regime Khomeini established—enshrined in an Islamic republican constitution adopted in October 1979 and amended in a national referendum of April 1989—consists of some elected and some appointed positions. National elections under the Islamic republic have always been held, and on time, even during the eightyear Iran-Iraq war, although there are limitations on who is allowed to run. Until the serious popular and intra-regime unrest that followed the June 12, 2009, presidential election, the regime had appeared relatively stable and faced only low-level and episodic unrest from minorities, intellectuals, students, labor groups, and women. Since the elections, the regime has struggled to contain the unrest, which some believe is evolving into a revolutionary movement that will be satisfied only with the outright replacement of the regime with a secular democracy. An increasing number of Iran experts believe this opposition movement—calling itself “The Green Path of Hope”—will eventually lead to a toppling or major alteration of the current regime.

The Supreme Leader, His Powers, and Other Ruling Councils

Upon Khomeini’s death, one of his disciples, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, was selected Supreme Leader by an elected 86-seat “Assembly of Experts.”1 Although he has never had Khomeini’s undisputed authority, Khamene’i has vast formal powers as Supreme Leader that have helped him maintain his grip on power. Amid reports Khamene’I believes that major concessions to the opposition will lead to regime demise, the protest movement is nonetheless increasingly bold in denouncing him and in defying his authority. Some of his peers have criticized his handling of the protest movement, while experts say he is now almost completely dependent on regime security forces, most notably the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Formally, the Supreme Leader is Commander in Chief of the armed forces, giving him the power to appoint commanders and to be represented on the highest national security body, the Supreme National Security Council, composed of top military and civilian security officials. He appoints half of the 12-member Council of Guardians;2 and the head of Iran’s judiciary (currently Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani). Headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the conservative-controlled Council of Guardians reviews legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic law, and it screens election candidates and certifies elections results. The Supreme Leader also has the power, under the constitution, to remove the elected President if either the judiciary or the elected Majles (parliament) say the President should be removed, with cause. The Supreme Leader appoints members of the 42-member Expediency Council, set up in 1988 to resolve legislative disagreements between the Majles and the Council of Guardians but its powers were expanded in 2006 to include oversight of the executive branch (cabinet) performance. Expediency Council members serve five-year terms. The Council, appointed most recently in February 2007, is still headed by Rafsanjani; its executive officer is former Revolutionary Guard commander-in-chief Mohsen Reza’i. The Assembly of Experts is empowered to oversee the work of the Supreme Leader and replace him if necessary, as well as to amend the constitution. The Assembly serves a six-year term; the fourth election for that Assembly was held on December 15, 2006. After that election, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, still a major figure having served two terms as president himself (1989-1997), was named deputy leader of the Assembly. After the death of the leader of the Assembly, Rafsanjani was selected its head in September 2007, outpointing a harder line competitor, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati. (See Figure 1 for a chart of the Iranian regime.)

1 The Assembly also has the power to amend Iran’s constitution.

2 The Council of Guardians consists of six Islamic jurists and six secular lawyers. The six Islamic jurists are appointed

by the Supreme Leader. The six lawyers on the Council are selected by the judiciary but confirmed by the Majles.

Table 1. Major Factions and Personalities

1.Conservatives

Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i    سید علی خامنه ای / رهبر جمهوری اسلامی                                                      

Born in July 1939 to an Azeri (Turkic) family from Mashhad. Lost the use of his right arm in an assassination attempt in June 1981. Helped organize the Revolutionary Guard and other post-revolution security organs. Served as elected president during 1981-1989 and was selected Khomeini’s successor in June 1989 upon the Ayatollah’s death. Upon that selection, his religious ranking was advanced in the state-run press and official organs to “Ayatollah” from the lower ranking “Hojjat ol-Islam.” Has all the formal powers but not the undisputed authority of his predecessor, founder of the revolutionary regime Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Like Khomeini, Khamene’i generally stays out of day-to-day governmental business but saves his prestige to resolve factional disputes or to quiet popular criticism of regime performance. Has taken more interventionist role to calm internal infighting in wake of June 2009 election dispute. Considered moderate-conservative on domestic policy but hardline on foreign policy and particularly toward Israel. Seeks to challenge U.S. hegemony and wants Israel defeated but respects U.S. military power and fears military confrontation with United States. Generally supports the business community (bazaaris), and opposes state control of the economy. Senior aides in his office include second son, Mojtaba, who is said to be acquiring increasing influence. Has made public reference to purported letters to him from President Obama that he asserts have asked for renewed U.S.-Iran relations.

Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts Chair Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani

رییس مجمع تشخیص مصلحت نظام و رییس مجلس خبرگان رهبری / علی اکبر هاشمی رفسنجانی                                                                                     

Long a key strategist of the regime, and longtime advocate of “grand bargain” to resolve all outstanding issues with United States, although on Iran’s terms. A mid-ranking cleric, now leads both Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts, although generally perceived as waning in influence generally. Heads moderate-conservative faction known as Executives of Construction. Was Majles speaker during 1981-89 and President 1989-1997. One of Iran’s richest men, family owns large share of Iran’s total pistachio nut production. Supported Musavi in June 2009 election, purportedly financed much of his campaign, and played behind-the-scenes role trying to persuade Supreme Leader to nullify the June 2009 election. Now considered essentially an opponent of the Supreme Leader, the arrest of five Rafsanjani family members in June 2009, may have reflected Khamene’I pressure on him. Daughter Faizah has participated in several opposition protests.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad  محمود احمدی نژاد / رییس جمهور جمهوری اسلامی                                     

Declared re-elected on June 12, 2009, and inaugurated August 5, but results still not accepted by his election challengers and protesters. See box on page 8. Majles Speaker Ali Larijani Overwhelming winner for Majles seat from Qom on March 14, 2008, and selected Majles Speaker on May 25 (237 out of 290 votes). Former state broadcasting head (1994-2004) and Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance (1993), was head of Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator from August 2005 until October 2007 resignation. Sought to avoid U.N. Security Council isolation. Politically close to Khamene’i but highly critical of Ahmadinejad and criticized election officials for the flawed June 12, 2009, election and subsequent crackdown. However, has grown increasingly threatening against protesters as the opposition has gained strength. Brother of judiciary head.

Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf    شهردار تهران / محمد باقر قالیباف                                                

Former Revolutionary Guard Air Force commander and police chief, but a moderate-conservative and ally of Larijani. Encourages comparisons of himself to Reza Shah, invoking an era of stability and strong leadership, while also making use of modern media tools. Lost in the 2005 presidential elections, but supporters won nine out of 15 seats on Tehran city council in December 2006 elections, propelling him to current post as mayor of Tehran. Recruited moderate conservatives for March 2008 Majles election.

Senior Clerics in Qom     مجمع مدرسین حوزه علمیه قم                                                                                       

The most senior clerics in Qom, including several Grand Ayatollahs, are generally “quietist”—they believe that the senior clergy should refrain from direct involvement in politics. These include Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi, Grand Ayatollah (former judiciary chief) Abdol Karim Musavi-Ardabili, and Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Sanei, all of whom have criticized regime crackdown against opposition protests. Others believe in political involvement, including Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi. He is founder of the hardline Haqqani school, and spiritual mentor of Ahmadinejad. Fared poorly in December 2006 elections for Assembly of Experts. An assertive defender of the powers of the Supreme Leader and a proponent of an “Islamic state” rather than the current “Islamic republic,” and advocates isolation from the West. May seek to replace Khamene’i. Another politically active senior cleric is Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, mentor of radical Iraqi cleric Moqtada Al Sadr.

Judiciary Chief/Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani   قوه قضاییه جمهوری اسلامی / آیت الله صادق لاریجانی                        

Larijani named in late August 2009 as Judiciary head, replacing Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahrudi, who had headed the Judiciary since 1999. Larijani is brother of Majles Speaker Ali Larijani; both are close to the Supreme Leader. Was appointed primarily to curb Ahmadinejad’s aggressive prosecutions of reformist leaders following June 2009 election dispute. Another Larijani brother, Mohammad Javad, was deputy Foreign Minister during the 1980s.

Militant Clerics Association  جامعه روحانیت مبارز                                                                                          

 Longtime organization of hardline clerics headed by Ayatollah Mohammad Mahdavi-Kani. Not to be confused with an organization with almost the same name, below. Did not back Ahmadinejad in June 12 presidential elections.

2.Opposition/”Green Path Hope”

All of the blocs and personalities below can be considered part of the Green Path of Hope opposition/revolutionary movement. However, overall leadership of the opposition is unclear, with several components competing for preeminence and the ability to determine the direction of the protest movement.

Mohammad Khatemi/Mir Hossein Musavi   محمد خاتمی و میر حسین موسوی                                                 

Khatemi—reformist president during 1997-2005 and declared he would run again for President in June 2009 elections, but withdrew when allied reformist Mir Hossein Musavi entered the race in late March 2009. Khatemi elected May 1997, with 69% of the vote; re-elected June 2001with 77%. Rode wave of sentiment for easing social and political restrictions among students, intellectuals, youths, and women that seeks reform but not outright replacement of the regime, but became disillusioned with Khatemi failure to stand up to hardliners on reform issues. Now heads International Center for Dialogue Among Civilizations. Visited U.S. in September 2006 to speak at Harvard and the Washington National Cathedral on “dialogue of civilizations.” Has hewed to staunch anti-Israel line of most Iranian officials, but perceived as open to accepting a Palestinian-Israeli compromise. Musavi has views similar to Khatemi on political and social freedoms and on reducing Iran’s international isolation, but supports strong state intervention in the economy to benefit workers, lower classes. Khatemi supported Musavi challenge to 2009 election legitimacy. Continues to appear at some protests, sometimes intercepted or constrained by regime security agents, but may be losing ground to harder line student opposition leaders who criticize his January 2010 statements indicating regime reconciliation is possible and who want to completely replace the current system. Some Green supporters have left Iran for Europe, Asia, or the United States. Some IRGC and parliamentary hardliners continue to urge his arrest.

Society of Militant Clerics/Mehdi Karrubi مجمع روحانیون مبارز / مهدی کروبی                                              

Reformist grouping once led by Mehdi Karrubi. Karrubi formed a separate “National Trust” faction after losing 2005 election. Ran again in 2009, but received few votes and subsequently has emerged, along with Musavi, as a symbol of the opposition.

Student Opposition Leaders          رهبران دانشجویی مخالف: “کنفدراسیون دانشجویان ایرانی” و “دفتر تحکیم وحدت”

Confederation of Iranian Students & Office of Consolidation of Unity (Daftar Tahkim-e- Vahdat)

Staunch oppositionists and revolutionaries, many now favor replacement of the regime with secular democracy. One key bloc in this group is the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), led by Amir Abbas Fakhravar, who was jailed for five years for participating in July 1999 student riots. CIS, committed to non-violent resistance, is successor of Office of Consolidation Unity, which led those riots. CIS supports international efforts to sanction the regime. At the time of those riots, the students had been strong Khatemi supporters, but turned against him for failing to challenge hardliners, particularly after July 1999 violent crackdown on student riots, in which four students were killed. Student leaders attempting—and increasingly succeeding—in gaining support of older generation, labor, clerics, and other segments to topple regime.

Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF) جبهه مشارکت ایران اسلامی                                                           

The most prominent and best organized pro-reform grouping, but has lost political ground to more active and forceful student core of Green Path opposition movement. Its leaders include Khatemi’s brother, Mohammad Reza Khatemi (a deputy speaker in the 2000-2004 Majles) and Mohsen Mirdamadi. Backed Musavi in June 12 election; several IIPF leaders, including Mirdamadi,detained and prosecuted in postelection dispute.

Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution   سازمان مجاهدین انقلاب اسلامی                                                              

Organization (MIR) Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support state control of the economy, but want greater political pluralism and relaxation of rules on social behavior. A major constituency of the reformist camp. Its leader is former Heavy Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi, who supported Musavi in 2009 election and was remains jailed for post-election unrest.

Shirin Abadi     شیرین عبادی                                                                                                                            

A number of dissidents have struggled against regime repression for many years, long before the election dispute. One major longtime dissident and human rights activist is Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2003) and Iran human rights activist lawyer Shirin Abadi. Subsequent to the passage of the U.N. General Assembly resolution above, Iranian authorities raided the Tehran office of the Center for Defenders of Human Rights, which she runs. She has often represented clients persecuted or prosecuted by the regime. She left Iran for Europe, fearing arrest in connection with the postelection dispute. In December 2009, the regime confiscated her Nobel Prize award.

Grand Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri    آیت الله العظمی حسین علی منتظری                                                    

Died December 20, 2009 of natural causes and has become a symbol of some oppositionists. Montazeri was Khomeini’s designated successor until 1989, when Khomeini dismissed him for allegedly protecting intellectuals and opponents of clerical rule He was released in January 2003 from several years of house arrest, and, despite being under close watch, issued statements highly critical of the postelection crackdown.

Other Long Term Dissidents    

Other leading dissidents have challenged the regime long before the presidential election. For example, joournalist Akbar Ganji conducted hunger strikes to protest regime oppression; he was released on schedule on March 18, 2006, after sentencing in 2001 to six years in prison for alleging high-level involvement in 1999 murders of Iranian dissident intellectuals that the regime had blamed on “rogue” security agents. Another prominent dissident is Abdol Karim Soroush, who challenged the doctrine of clerical rule. Others in this category include former Revolutionary Guard organizer Mohsen Sazegara, former Culture Minister Ataollah Mohajerani, and Mohsen Kadivar. 

Congressional Research Service

7-5700, www.crs.gov, RL32048

 Iran’s opposition movement has yet to produce a charismatic leader but has a diverse and growing group of organizers, including numerous students and veterans of an abortive 1999 uprising, Iran specialists say.

The Green Movement’s titular heads remain Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the two presidential candidates who refused to accept the results of June election that gave incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a tainted “landslide” victory.

“The student organizations at major universities are still the most organized ones, but there are also other ‘natural’ organizations that appear nonpolitical but in fact are gathering places in which the news of planned actions and slogans are passed along, like associations of painters, calligraphers, etc.,” he said.

“Students and youths are still the engine of the movement, but it is rapidly spreading to parents actively supporting their children.”

Mr. Uskowi said the issue of leadership seems less urgent than the harder task of organizing a large organic movement. He said another strong incentive for leading personalities to keep a low profile is the regime’s readiness to arrest anyone identified as an organizer.

The Ministry of Intelligence has infiltrated agents into the Office to Consolidate Unity, a student body that led the last widespread student protests in 1999.

In July of that year, students at Tehran University gathered to protest the closure of a reform newspaper and were set upon by government-backed vigilantes known as Ansar e-Hezbollahi. They threw students from dormitory balconies, killing at least one and injuring and arresting scores. Outraged, young people took to the streets of Tehran for a week, smashed store windows, threw stones at police and burned pictures of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader. Then President Mohammad Khatami, who initially supported the students, backed down under pressure from Ayatollah Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards, and the movement fizzled.

Unlike the situation in 1999, however, the current movement has expanded far beyond university campuses to encompass disparate and overlapping groups, including human rights advocates, women, discontented clerics, unemployed and underemployed workers and directionless members of Iran’s third post-revolutionary generation angry at the current order.

Clerical involvement, which had been relatively minor in the weeks and months after the June vote, has revived since the death Dec. 20 of Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri, a dissident once slated to be Iran’s supreme leader. Government efforts to restrict mourning for the cleric brought thousands of angry, devout Shi’ites to the streets in the theological center of Qom and the cleric’s hometown of Najafabad, which was put under martial law.

“Reformists organized the protests for Montazeri’s death,” said Roohollah Shahsavar, a youth activist in the northeastern Iranian city of Mashhad who escaped the country after consecutive arrests and now runs a newspaper called Nedaye Sabz (Green Voice) from his Paris exile. “The Green Revolution group is composed of reformist supporters of Khatami, Karroubi and Mousavi spread across Turkey, France and Belgium and also inside Iran,” he said.

Plenty of exiles are vying for control of the movement. Among them are Mr. Fakhravar and Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late shah.

On Thursday, Mr. Pahlavi urged nations worldwide to withdraw their ambassadors from Tehran. In an interview with the Associated Press, he equated the climate of the unrest in Iran now with the “revolutionary atmosphere” that preceded his father’s overthrow. The difference, he said, is that this time the people know what they want - a secular democracy.

Government repression has limited their ability to move among the people. On Tuesday, Mr. Karroubi’s son said authorities were no longer providing protection for his father when he leaves home, in effect putting him under house arrest. On Sunday, a nephew of Mr. Mousavi was killed by security forces, according to opposition Web sites, to intimidate the candidate.

While the government focuses on these two men, however, a new generation of activists is working behind the scenes to sustain the movement’s momentum.

“There appear to be a core of student leaders, recent graduates and people who were students in 1999,” said Kenneth Katzman, an Iran specialist at the Congressional Research Service in Washington.

He said these leaders have “agreed on nonviolence and are trying to reach out to their parent’s generation” and to supporters outside Iran.

Mr. Katzman said the activists had organized into cells of about 10 for security reasons.

“They are very optimistic,” Mr. Katzman said. “They believe they are going to be rid of [the regime] in six months to a year. They feel that a lot of security people are starting to back off because they don’t know how this will come out and don’t want to be” on the losing side.

Amir Abbas Fakhravar, 35, a former student leader who spent several years in prison in Iran and now lives in the Washington area, said contacts are taking place on Facebook and Skype and that activists plan to create a “revolutionary council” of about 15 people inside and outside Iran to lead the “Iranian Green Revolution.” He said this leadership might emerge before Feb. 11, the 31st anniversary of the fall of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi - another official holiday when masses of Iranians are likely to go into the streets to continue their protests.

Nader Uskowi, another Washington-based Iran specialist and consultant to the U.S. government, said, “We are probably a few months off from the day we see a clear leader emerging.”

“Everyone wants to lead this movement but the question is whether the people out on the streets risking their own lives will accept self-styled leaders coming from Washington, Paris or even recent exiles in countries neighboring Iran,” said Delbar Tavakoli, a journalist who was forced to flee to Ankara after the recent elections. “Even Mousavi and Karroubi have become a toy in the hands of the people - they don’t have the latitude to issue anything beyond standard announcements or instruct supporters in how to behave.”

A Washington Times reporter’s experience in Iran immediately after the June elections gives a sense of how the protests are being organized.

A student leader in a bedroom in one of Tehran University’s dormitories issued curt instructions into his cell phone to students in the streets.

“Let them burn rubbish bins but not any more banks,” he said.

The spartan room was decorated with a potted cactus, a television monitor and a window whose glass had been smashed when a Basij paramilitary had lobbed a stone through it during a raid the previous week.

“Mousavi supporters are nearing Tajrish now,” a cell phone caller informed the student leader, illustrating how demonstrations were being organized at opposite sides of the city to stretch the capacity of police to respond.

The student leader was among hundreds of activists who have gone underground since the crisis began, hopping between the houses of sympathizers and emerging on demonstration days to organize resistance to the government.

Djavad Salehi-Esfahani, a professor of economics at Virginia Tech and an Iran specialist, said Mr. Mousavi, a former prime minister and revolutionary stalwart, still has the potential to lead the movement.

He “is doing well so far. I can’t see him losing the leadership to others outside the country,” Mr. Salehi-Esfahani said. “He has wide appeal and will probably have to fight elements inside the Green Movement who are pushing for overthrowing the Islamic republic rather than reforming it.”

Mr. Katzman said, however, that many of the young people with whom he has had contact are not interested in the reformers. He said these young activists criticize foreign media for paying too much attention to Mr. Mousavi and Mr. Karroubi.

As violence escalates, the new leadership might be military, given the stake of the Revolutionary Guards in the status quo.

Whoever emerges, “the regime is definitely in trouble,” Mr. Katzman said.

c Barbara Slavin reported from Washington.

Amir Abbas Fakhravar, the Secretary General of The Confederation of Iranian Students, said opposition activists plan to create a “revolutionary council” to lead a “Green Revolution.”

“The Islamic Republic of Iran: Multidisciplinary Analyses of Its Theocracy, Nationalism, and Assertion of Power”

Marriott Downtown at Key Center Cleveland, Nov. 8-10

The Conference is in conjunction with the Program in Judaic Studies at Case Western Reserve University

Please join us for this exciting and important conference. Keynote speakers include such important scholars, journalists and policy makers such as:

Keynote Speakers

Effie Eitam, MK, Israel
Irwin Cotler, Prof. McGill University, MP Canada, Former Canadian Minister of Justice, Human Rights Activist
Ambassador Jackie Wolcott, Special U.S. Envoy for Nuclear Nonproliferation

Featured Conference Presenters
(subject to change)

Amir A. Fakhravar, Iranian Enterprise Institute, Secretary General of Confederation of Iranian Students   Nikahang Kowsar, Iranian journalist and cartoonist
Vernice Cain, University of Pennsylvania
Patrick Clawson, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Andrew Apostolou, Iran Desk, Freedom House, Washington DC
Edwin Black, Journalist and author
Avner Falk, Jerusalem, Israel
Yitzhak Kerem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Aristotle University, Greece
Andrew Bostom, Brown University
David Menashri, Chair Dept of Iran Studies, Tel Aviv University
Kenneth Marcus, Baruch College
Majid Mohammed, Iranian political sociologist, Stony Brook Institute for Global Studies
Renee Redman, Iran Human Rights Documentation Center
Elihu Richter, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Barry Rubin, GLORIA Center, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya
Farhad Sabetan, CSU, East Bay
Charles Small, Yale Institute for the Interdisciplinary Study of Anti-Semitism
Philip Steinberg, Florida State University
and many other distinguished scholars and researchers.

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Cleveland, OH 44114-1305
216/ 696-9200 (direct)

Reservations: 800/228-9290

Fax 216/ 696-8615

Guests can also call our reservation line at (800) 228-9290 or (440) 542-2313. Please use group code is spespea or reserve a room on line through the following link:

http://www.marriott.com/hotels/travel/clesc?groupCode=spespea&app=resvlink&fromDate=&toDate =

Schedule: Subject to Change

SUNDAY, Nov 8, 2009

12:30-2:00 - Lunch -

The Honorable Effie Eitam (Israeli MK)

Introductory remarks by Israel Consul General, Daniel Kutner (Philadelphia)

2:10- 4:00 - Panel on Journalism and Iran - Edwin Black, Journalist and Author, and Nikahang Kowsar,Iranian-Canadian journalist and cartoonist: the Islamic Republic; God’s gift to political cartoonists

4:15 -5:30 - Patrick Clawson, Washington Institute of Near East Policy

5:30-6:30 - Wine and cheese reception

6:30-8:00 - Dinner - Rabbi Eric Lankin, Jewish National Fund

Edward S. Beck, Walden University and SPME President

The Honorable Irwin Cotler, Member of Parliament, Canada

8:15 - Panel on Iranian Anti-Semitism - Charles Small (Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Anti-Semitism) and Kenneth Marcus (Ackerman Visiting Professor of Equality and Justice in America at Baruch College)

MONDAY, Nov 9, 2009

8:30-10:00 - Panel on Function of Pride and Humiliation - Avner Falk (Jerusalem) and Philip Steinberg (Florida State Univ.)

10:15- 11:30 -Shiism and Holy War - Yitzhak Kerem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and AristotleUniversity, Thessaloniki and Majid Mohammed, Iranian political sociologist, Stony Brook Institute for Global Studies Shiite Islamism in Contemporary Iran: Shiite Political Ideologies in Construction and Transition

11:45-1:45 - lunch –Iranian Human Rights -Amir A. Fakhravar, Iranian Enterprise Institute and Secretary General of CIS and Renee Redman, Iran Human Rights Documentation Center and Vernice Cain Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania: Lifting the Veil in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Post Election Unrest, a Prelude to Iranian Reform and Human Rights Movements
2:00-3:00 - Rhetoric of Genocide - Elihu Richter, Hebrew University and and Andrew G. Bostom, Brown University Shi’ite Iran’s Genocidal Jew Hatred

3:30-4:30 - Andrew Apostolou, Head of Iran Desk for Freedom House Washington DC

5:00-6:15 - Iranian Foreign Policy - Barry Rubin (Israel GLORIA Center) -
6:30-8:00 - dinner - The Honorable Ambassador Jackie Wolcott
Iran and Nuclear Proliferation

8:00 - 9:15 - David Menashri, Chair Dept of Iran Studies Tel Aviv University Revolutionary Iran: Radicalism versus Pragmatism — How can the world convince Iran to suspend its nuclear program?

TUESDAY, Nov 10, 2009:

SPME board meeting with Chapter coordinators

Here at the Confederation of the Iranian Students in the UK we hope to create an environment for Iranian students to hold discussions regarding the future of their country with their peers, and with government officials. We hope to be the voice of Iranian students inside Iran who do not have the opportunity to communicate freely and openly with the West and help them achieve a free democratic government in Iran.

Iranian students are aware of a need for mutual aid with the people and governments of the West to send a clear and sound message to the Iranian regime: our country can no longer remain isolated from the rest of the international community and our people demand the observation of their human rights. We hope to achieve a country that is part of the global society not a predicament to it.

Somi Abedinzadeh

A tentative list of scheduled speakers include: Sen. Sam Brownback (R-KS), Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NY), Congressman Todd Tiahrt (R-KS), Kristen Silverberg, former United States Ambassador to the European Union, Montgomery County Executive Ike Leggett (D-MoCo), Executive Director of the Interfaith Conference of Metropolitan Washington Reverend Clark Lobenstein, Iranian jailed dissident and president of the Iranian Enterprise Institute Amir Abbas Fakhravar, Lynn Smith Derbyshire, whose brother Captain Vince Smith, was among the 241 U.S. Marines killed in the Iranian-backed Hezbollah attack in Lebanon in 1983, and Kristen Silverberg, former United States Ambassador to the European Union. Please contact us for an updated list of confirmed speakers.

The following organizations are rally co-sponsors or will be represented by speakers at the event: American Jewish Committee, Baltimore Zionist District, Endowment for Middle East Truth, Greater Washington Area Hadassah, Interfaith Conference of Metropolitan Washington, Iranian Enterprise Institute, Jewish Community Center of Greater Washington, Jewish Community Center of Northern Virginia, Jewish Council for Public Affairs, The Jewish Federation of Greater Washington, Korean American Association of the Metropolitan Area, Korean Association of the State of Maryland, National Jewish Democratic Council, Republican Jewish Coalition, The Council of Churches of Greater Washington, The Israel Project, and United Macedonian Diaspora.